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MISREPRESENTATIONS BEFORE THE
PATENT OFFICE: ANTITRUST AND
OTHER LEGAL EFFECTS
JOHN F. CARNEY*
The Supreme Court has recently acknowledged the heavy adminis-
trative burden facing the Patent Office. "[Tihe Patent Office is con-
fronted with a most difficult task. Almost 100,000 applications for
patents are filed each year. Of these, about 50,000 are granted and the
backlog now runs well over 200,000."' Since it reaches its decision as
to patentability on each of these applications in an ex parte proceeding,2
without the benefit of full research facilities of its own, the Patent
Office must rely almost exclusively upon the information furnished by
applicants and their attorneys .° The heightened judicial awareness of
this heavy administrative burden has led many courts to conclude
that "[a]bsolute honesty and good faith disclosure is necessary"' by
those who have applications pending before the Patent Office.
Furthermore, the issue of honesty in patent procurement has as-
sumed greater significance in patent litigation. For example, in Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp.,e the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that one sued for pitent infringe-
ment can either challenge the validity of the patent on the grounds of
* B.A., Hofstra University, 1961; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1964; Member, New
York Bar; Associate, Breed, Abbott & Morgan, New York.
1 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,, 18 (1966). See also, Monsanto Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co,, 312 F. Supp. 778, 793 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
2 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
8 Ringsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v.
Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970); Charles
Pfizer v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
4 Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking GaAs Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 470
(D. Del. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
826 (1967); Charles Pfizer v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir, 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
920 (1969); Precision instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach, Co., 324
U.S. 806, 818 (1945).
a 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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fraudulent procurement or may raise the issue in a declaratory judg-
ment action.° The Court further held that a patent obtained as a result
of a knowing and willful misrepresentation might serve as a basis for
an antitrust action.'
Where patent invalidity or unenforceability, or an antitrust claim
predicated upon a misrepresentation before the Patent Office is as-
serted, the vagaries of the common law form of action for deceit con-
tinue to play a pervasive role. Historically, the action for deceit
required a high degree of proof of each of the six elements of the cause
of action: representation, falsity, scienter, materiality, reliance and
injury.° Of these six elements, reliance, materiality and scienter have
provided the most formidable obstacles to success in cases based upon
alleged misrepresentations before the Patent Office.
Reliance refers to the requirement that the party defrauded was
misled by the misrepresentation and that it was a substantial induce-
ment in influencing his action.° This same concept is sometimes referred
to as "materiality," although materiality is more appropriately con-
fined to the question of whether a reasonable man would have been
influenced by the misrepresentation. Scienter has been described as
involving "the intent that a representation shall be made, that it shall
be directed to a particular person or class of persons, that it shall con-
vey a certain meaning, that it shall be believed and that it shall be
acted upon in a certain way."" But most importantly, scienter also
requires proof that the party making the representation knew it to be
false, yet nevertheless made it to mislead the recipient.
At early common law, remedies for misrepresentations were nar-
rowly confined because they were generally made in the course of
arm's-length bargaining transactions between distrustful adversaries.
In such a context, the doctrine of caveat emptor required the recipient
of the representation to be wary of his adversary. More recent deci-
sions, however, reflect a complete shift away from such an attitude and
toward a "recognition of a new standard of business ethics, demanding
that statements of fact be at least honestly and carefully made. . . ." 11
This article considers the propriety of incorporating in their
pristine rigor the elements of common law deceit into actions predicated
upon misrepresentations before the Patent Office. Further, it suggests
modifications in accord with the realities of proceedings before the
6 Id. at 175-76.
7 Id. at 177-78.
See e.g., Hanlon v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 302 N.Y. 502, 509, 99 N.E.2d
546, 549 (1951); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 700 (1964 ed.) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
Prosser, supra note 8, at 729.
10 Id. at 715.
11 Id. at 733.
1006
MISREPRESENTATIONS BEFORE THE PATENT OFFICE
Patent Office, and in harmony with the development of other remedies
for misrepresentation, in order to implement more effectively the public
policy goals implicit in the patent and antitrust laws.
I. OPERATING PROCEDURES BEFORE THE PATENT OFFICE
AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR MISREPRESENTATION
A party believing that he has a patentable invention must file
before the Patent Office an application which includes a written de-
scription of the invention known as a specification." The specification
must "conclude with a claim particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his inven-
tion or discovery."" Further, it "must set forth the precise invention
for which a patent is solicited, in such manner as to distinguish it
from other inventions and from what is old. . . .
The patent examiner studies the application and makes an inves-
tigation of the prior art. After this investigation is completed, the appli-
cation is either approved and a patent granted, or disapproved and the
applicant notified of the adverse decision. If the examiner's determina-
tion is adverse, he must state his reasons for rejection and refer to the
information or references underlying this decision." In Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins,' the Supreme Court well summarized the proceedings before
the Patent Office:
The regulations do not require the Office to make a final judg-
ment on an invention's patentability on the basis of the in-
ventor's original application. While it sometimes happens
that a patent is granted at this early stage, it is far more com-
mon for the Office to find that although certain of the appli-
cant's claims may be patentable, certain others have been
fully anticipated by the earlier developments in the art. In
such a situation, the Patent Office does not attempt to sepa-
rate the wheat from the chaff on its own initiative. Instead,
it rejects the application giving the inventor the right to make
an amendment which narrows his claim to cover only those
aspects of the invention which are truly novel. It often hap-
pens, however, that even after an application is amended, the
Patent Office finds that some of the remaining claims are
unpatentable. When this occurs, the agency again issues a
rejection which is subject to further amendment. And so the
12 37 C.F.R. § 1.71 (1970).
18 37 C.F.R. § 1.7S(a) (1970).
14 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b) (1970).
18 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b) (1970).
18 395 U.S.  653 (1969).
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process -of rejection and amendment continues until the
Patent Office Examiner either grants a patent or concludes
that none of the inventor's claims could possibly be pat-
entable, at which time a final rejection is entered on the
Office's records."
This dialogue between the Patent Office and the applicant results in a
series of written statements" indicating the examiner's objections to
the issuance of the patent and the applicant's efforts to overcome
them. These papers are kept on file in the Patent Office and are col-
lectively known as the "file wrapper."
In addition to amending the application to overcome the Patent
Office's objections, an applicant is permitted to file affidavits designed
to overcome the references cited by the patent examiner, to point out
that the applicant's invention was discovered prior to the existence
of the cited reference, or to distinguish the claimed invention from the
cited reference." This procedure and the opportunities it presents for
misleading the Patent Office are well illustrated in Monsanto Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co." In Monsanto, the application was for a patent on
a compound possessing "unusual and valuable herbicidal activity.""
This application was initially rejected by the patent examiner. In an
effort to overcome the rejection, an affidavit was filed to demonstrate
that the compound in question possessed much greater herbicidal ac-
tivity than related compounds. This affidavit reported the results of a
series of tests which compared the compound in question, propanil,
with related compounds. In these tests, the comparison compounds
were proven much less effective herbicides than the compound sought
to be patented. The District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania found that the affidavit was misleading because in addition to
the tests reported, the applicant had performed other unreported tests
indicating that other related compounds had greater herbicidal activity
than those reported." In addition, the court found that the applicant
was aware of an article indicating that a certain related compound had
higher herbicidal activity for a related compound, but that this article
17 Id. at 658.
18 Even if the applicant orally makes his arguments to the examiner in an interview,
the regulations require that "[I]n every instance where reconsideration is requested in
view of an interview with an examiner, a complete written statement of the reasons
stated at the interview as warranting favorable action must be filed by the applicant."
37 C.F.R. § 1.33(6) (1970).
19 37 C.F.R.	 1.131, 1.132 (1970).
29 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
21 Id. at 785.
22 Id. at 792-94.
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was not brought to the attention of the Patent Office. In reaching its
decision the court .stated:
Although the affidavit contains no affirmative misrepresenta-
tion and is accurate so far as it gOes, it is misleading, and was
intended to be misleading, in that it fails to state facts known
to the applicant which were inconsistent with its position
that propanil is a superior herbicide. It is, in short, composed
of half-truths. The, facts not stated would tend to show that
closely related compounds do have more than just slight
herbicidal value depending on the rate of application and the
plant species to which the compounds are applied."
Considering this very same patent, however, a federal district
court in Texas ruled that failure to present this information before
the Patent Office was permissible since the applicants, "did nothing
more than put their best foot forward."" In Monsanto, the Penn-
sylvania district court responded to the holding in the Texas opinion
by saying quite clearly:
We specifically disapprove of any concept which permits pat-
ent applicants to "put their best foot forward" before the
Patent Office . . . . This kind of concept is only workable in
adversary proceedings where the other side can be relied
upon to bring out all of the facts adverse to the granting of
the patent. In view of the realities of the patent office back-
log, a standard of disclosure appropriate to adversary pro-
ceedings would defeat the public interest in not having patents
improvidently issued."
The Pennsylvania court's rejection, in proceedings before the Patent
Office, of the ethics appropriate to an adversary proceeding, reflects
the prevailing judicial viewpoint. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has described the patent applicant as standing before the
Patent Office in a "confidential relationship" wherein he has the obli-
gation of making frank and truthful statements." Even more strongly,
a recent decision in the Fifth Circuit declares that "our patent system
could not function successfully if applicants were allowed to approach
the Patent Office as an arm's length adversary." 27
213 Id. at 791.
24 Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 312 F. Supp. 452, 463 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
26 Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 799-800 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
26 Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574, 479 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 920 (1969). See Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949).
27 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970).
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II. MISREPRESENTATION BEFORE THE PATENT OFFICE:
SCIENTER, RELIANCE AND MATERIALITY
Ever since Pasley v. Freeman" it has become settled that a false
statement of a material fact, known to be such and made by the speaker
to induce action, provides a basis for liability for the damage caused by
action in reliance on the statement. A century later, in Derry v. Peek,"
the English House of Lords narrowly limited this rule to situations in
which the misrepresentation was knowingly made without belief in its
truth. The Derry case involved a prospectus for a Tramway company
in which appeared the statement that "the company has the right to
use steam, or mechanical motive power, instead of horses . . . .”" The
company had no such right, and, after it became bankrupt, a dis-
gruntled stockholder sued the directors, basing his cause of action upon
the misrepresentation. The House of Lords concluded that the defen-
dants honestly believed that the statements were true, although they
had no reasonable grounds for their belief. The court emphasized that
"it is essential . . . that moral fraud should be established. . . .""
(Emphasis added.) According to Lord Bramwell, any other rule would
have rendered "all character precarious." 82
This moral obloquy associated with the labeling of conduct as
fraudulent continues to exert its influence in rendering judges reluctant
to fix liability for misrepresentation in cases involving patents unless
the actors can be proven morally blameworthy." This concern of
Derry v. Peek is plainly echoed in Ransburg Electra-Coating Corp. v.
Nordson Corp.34
 Upon finding that the defendants had not satisfied
the heavy burden of proving that the patent holder acted "fraudu-
lently, intentionally or willfully,”" the court in Ransburg held that the
patent was not unenforceable and declared: "To hold otherwise would
work a forfeiture of the patentees' property in the absence of un-
conscionable or morally reprehensible conduct, something which equity
is always reluctant to do.”"
This result contrasts sharply with the results reached in actions
28 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 176).
20 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
3° Id. at 338.
31 Id. at 356.
32
 Id. at 345.
33 The unwillingness of the House of Lords in Derry to find the defendants, who
were respected in the business community, guilty of deceit, is paralleled by the Seventh
Circuit's unwillingness to uphold a lower court decision of fraud where to do so
"would mean there was a conspiracy among several competent and highly regarded
scientific men.. .." Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143, 148 (7th Cir. 1960).
• 34 293 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Ill. 1968). .
35
 Id. at 483.
38 Id.
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for misrepresentations not involving patents, for, in situations where
the party making the misrepresentation was in a position of superior
knowledge, or made a representation in a form so positive as to convey
personal knowledge, damages have commonly been awarded regardless
of a showing of intentional deceit." Requiring the higher burden of
proof of intentional deceit in patent cases is questionable since it is
generally necessary for the Patent Office to rely upon the truth of the
representations of the patentee. Additionally, the Supreme Court has
made clear that the public has a "paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other
inequitable conduct."" Since "both public and private standards of
equity"" are involved in the patent monopoly, a breach of the pat-
entee's duty of full and frank disclosure should be an adequate basis
for holding a patent unenforceable."
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemi-
cal Corp.,'" the Supreme Court made it clear that proof of a wilful and
knowing misrepresentation of a material fact before the Patent Office
is a sufficient predicate for an antitrust action for damages for injury
suffered by virtue of the fraudulently procured patent. The Supreme
Court's dictum that defendant's "good faith would furnish a complete
defense"42 is susceptible of the interpretation that the Court was in-
corporating the requirement of "moral fraud," found essential in
Derry v. Peek." The Court in Walker Process, however, left open the
question of what constitutes "good faith."
American courts have recognized that the elements of proof devel-
oped at early common law in suits between parties to arm's-length
transactions involving lands and ordinary chattels, may not be appro-
priate to situations where the exigencies require the recipient of the
information to rely upon the good faith of the other party to the
transaction. As Justice Goldberg aptly noted in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, inc.," "[t] he content of common-law fraud has not
87 Harper & McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 Minn. L.
Rev. 939, 955-57 (1938).
88 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945).
88 Id.
48 A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 17-18 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968) ; Ritter v. Rohm & Haas Co., 271 F. Supp. 313, 342 n.73
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Abington Textile Mach. Works v. Carding Specialists (Canada) Ltd.,
249 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1965).
41 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
42 Id. at 177.
' 48 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Walker Process strongly supports this
view. He suggests that one of the conditions is that "the relevant patent is shown to
have been procured by knowing and wilful fraud. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 179.
44 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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remained static as the courts below seem to have assumed. It has
varied, for example, with the nature of the relief sought, the relation-
ship between the parties, and the merchandise in issue."" Most courts
have acknowledged that the patent applicant stands before the Patent
Office in a fiduciary relationship, and thus has a duty to make a full
and iair disclosure of all facts which may affect the patentability of his
invention." With regard to one in such a fiduciary relationship, the
Supreme Court has stated that there is "an affirmative duty of 'utmost
good faith and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,' as well as
an affirmative obligation 'to employ reasonable care to avoid mislead-
ing his clients' "47
Since the patent applicant has a duty to disclose fully and truth-
fully all facts which might reasonably bear on the issuance of the
patent, there are strong arguments that a breach of that duty" should
serve as an adequate predicate for an antitrust treble damage action
where there has been a misrepresentation as to a legally material fact.
If a patent obtained as a result of misrepresentation has had the effects
of an antitrust violation, such as excluding the claimant from entering
a particular market, it would seem that the damaged party should be
compensated. Although it may be contended that the treble damage
sanction of the antitrust laws is too harsh a remedy for conduct not
intentionally wrongful, other violations of the antitrust laws do not
require proof of conscious wrongdoing. Indeed, it is quite clear that
good faith, good intentions, and even admitted social benefits do not
afford a defense to most antitrust suits." The justification for awarding
treble damages is that there is a public interest in the preservation of
free competition, which public interest is served by private antitrust
suits. The treble damage remedy serves as an inducement to private
individuals to initiate such suits. Given the far-reaching social and
economic effects of improvidently issued patents, it would seem that
the reasons for the treble damage action should apply a fortiori where
a patent has been acquired through breach of the duty of full and
48 Id. at 193.
46 Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949) ; Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chem-
tronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970) ; Monolith
Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co., 407 F.2d 288, 294 (9th
Cir. 1969) ; Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 Fad 574, 579 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
47 375 US. 180, 194 (1963).
48 The Ninth Circuit has stated that "conduct short of fraud and in excess of
simple negligence is also an adequate foundation for deciding a patent application is
exceptional [for purposes of awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party]." Monolith
Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co., 407 F.2d 288, 294 (9th
Cir. 1969).
60 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, 379 (1955).
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fair disclosure. Even conceding that good faith" requiiei the fact'
finder to make some judgment . concerning the moral qualities of the
parties before the Patent Office, there is a theory of liability suggested
by Professor Williston which may be applicable to the situation:
Now one who asserts as a fact something of which he has
no positive knowledge, not only asserts that the fact is as he
states—something which he may well believe—but also im-
pliedly that he knows it is so or that he has an adequate basis
of information. If this is not true he is asserting a falsehood
as much as if he did not believe the truth of his express state-
ment.
• • • .
[I]n the American cases cited above the court proceeded
upon the theory that the plaintiff must recover if the defen-
dant asserted as a matter of his own knowledge something
which in fact he did not know, or for which he had no rea-
sonable basis of belief."
Thus, in the patent situation, the applicant who makes a false state-
ment impliedly represents that he has personal knowledge of the fact
asserted, and since it can be inferred that he knew that he did not
have such knowledge, it can be found that he had the intent to deceive
as to the extent of his knowledge." Similarly, if pertinent facts are
readily available, and the applicant fails to bring them to the atten-
tion of the Patent Office so that the statements made are misleading,
it may be inferred that the statements were made with reckless dis-
regard of their truth or falsity, which is tantamount to an intent to
deceive."
Although not suggested by the Supreme Court in Walker Process,
it would not be inconsistent with that decision to require that the
party asserting good faith as a defense to prove that he had reasonable
grounds to believe in the truth of the representation, or that he be-
lieved that the facts withheld were not such as might affect the pat-
entability of the invention. In othei words, if the applicant, seeks to
80 On the other band, it might be argued that "good faith" requires proof that
the applicant has met his obligations of full disclosure. One court of appeals has de-
clared: "We agree with the Supreme Court of Michigan that 'Good faith includes,
not only personal upright mental attitude and clear conscience, but also intention to
observe legal duties.' " Kiyoichi Fujikama v. Sunrise Soda Water Works Co., 158 F.2d
490, 494 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 832 (1947).
DI Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 415, 432
(1911).
52 See Prosser, supra note 8, at 716.
This implies that the party asserting the fraud must prove that these • facts
were readily available.
1013
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL .LAW REVIEW
assert good faith as a defense, it might be appropriate to place on him
the burden of proving that in spite of his failure•to bring the pertinent
available information to the attention of the Patent Office, he neverthe-
less made a good faith effort to fulfill his "uncompromising duty of
disclosure." Such a requirement is consistent with the rule that the
entire patent is invalid if there is "overclaiming" as to one claim unless
the applicant shows that the overclaiming was due to inadvertence and
files a prompt disclaimer." It will be noted that the duty of disclosure
articulated by the Ninth Circuit includes not only legally material
facts, but "all facts which may affect . . . patentability. . . ."" The
patentee would be able to meet the burden of proving his good faith
where he had no knowledge of the facts withheld or where he was
confident that the facts withheld were not pertinent to the application.
However, a showing of a belief that the facts withheld or misrepre-
sented were not legally material would not be sufficient where the pat-
entee or his representatives recognized the pertinency of the facts to
the application.
In summary, it is suggested that in a situation where one has
been damaged as a result of another's misrepresentation before the
Patent Office, the judicial reluctance to impose liability except on the
conscious wrongdoer should be tempered, at least to the extent of cast-
ing on the party making a misrepresentation as to material facts—
where the pertinent facts were available to him—the burden of per-
suasion as to his innocent intentions.
In the recent. case of SCM v. Radio Corporation of America,"
Judge McLean concluded that while a misrepresentation before the
Patent Office must be material in order to base an antitrust claim on
fraudulent procurement, nevertheless, an intentional misrepresenta-
tion need not be material to bar enforcement of the patent. In reaching
this result, the court relied upon the district court opinion in Corning
Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.," and on a series of
Supreme Court decisions stressing the public policy reasons for en-
couraging complete candor by applicants before the Patent Office.
The decisions are in accord that materiality is not requisite to
find the patent unenforceable, but is requisite for an antitrust claim
based upon the fraudulent procurement of the patent. Despite this
verbal agreement, however, their judicial concepts of materiality ap-
54 Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 57-58
(1943).
55 Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co., 407 F.2d
288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969).
56 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970 )•
57 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966), •rev'd on other•grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826 (1967).
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parently differ. In Corning Glass, the court defined materiality in the
following terms:
Having found the plaintiff had an invention which was
patentable over the prior art, as a legal proposition, defen-
dant's allegations of fraud must fail: Not only must the defen-
dant establish that an intentional misrepresentation was made
to the patent examiner, but also defendant must show that
the misrepresentation was material, i.e., that the patent would
not have issued but for the fraud. Since the patentee was
legally entitled to the patent, any misrepresentation directed
to overcoming the prior art, assuming arguendo there were
some, could not be material."
This concept of materiality, referred to as legal materiality, focuses
upon whether, as a matter of law, the truth of the facts belied by the
misrepresentation renders the patent invalid.
However, materiality may also embrace a consideration of the
subjective question of whether there was actual reliance by the patent
examiner upon the misrepresentation. In considering the question of
whether the alleged misrepresentation would be an adequate predicate
for an antitrust action, Judge McLean stated in the SCM case:
The party asserting invalidity of a patent on the ground
of fraud has the burden of proving, not only the fraud, but
also the fact that the fraud was material, i.e., that if the ex-
aminer had known the true facts he would not have autho-
rized the issuance of the patent . . . ."
That the court in SCM was searching the record for proof of
actual reliance by the patent examiner is apparent from its conclusion
based upon an examination of the file wrapper. After a thorough
review of the patent examiner's report, the court found no convincing
evidence, one way or the other "as to what the examiner would have
done had be been informed in September 1956 that photoconductivity
measurements by the DeVore method were somewhat inexact . . . 2 4°
Finally, the court stated that "[ii n the final analysis, what position the
examiner would have taken had RCA been candid with him remains
a matter of speculation."1 Significantly, Judge McLean did not address
himself to the question of legal materiality, but found that failure to
prove actual reliance barred antitrust relief predicated upon an invalid
patent.
68 253 F. Supp. at 469-70.
69 318 F. Supp. 433, 448 (S.DN.Y. 1970).
60 Id.
51 Id. at 449.
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III. UNENFORCEABILITY AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
PATENT VALIDITY
The cases involving misrepresentation before the Patent Office
tend to blur the distinction between actual reliance and legal material-
ity. If the issue before the court is the enforceability of the patent
or the destruction of the presumption of validity which every patent
enjoys, it would serve no purpose to require a finding of legal ma-
teriality as that term is defined in Corning Glass, because that defini-
tion assumes that the patent is invalid. Consequently, it would be
superfluous to hold an invalid and hence unenforceable patent unen-
forceable on the further ground of fraud in its procurement.
On the other hand, in situations where the misrepresentation is
not legally material, actual reliance by the examiner might be con-
sidered necessary to render the patent unenforceable. This is ap-
parently the position taken by the court in Monsanto Co. v. Dawson
Chemical Co.," where the court declared: "There is also a further
requirement that defendant must prove that the information was ma-
terial in the sense that if the patent examiner had known of the
additional facts . . . he would not have issued the patent."68 In SCM,
however, the court rejected the necessity for a finding of actual reli-
ance to hold the patent unenforceable. This latter decision is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Precision Instrument:
"The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent,
therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other in-
equitable conduct. . . ."" Similarly, in Corning Glass the court noted
that even if the misrepresentations are not legally material, neverthe-
less, it, being a court of equity, "can and should refuse to enforce
the patent if the Court finds the patentee made intentional misrepre-
sentations to the patent examiner. • . ." 65
Other cases considering this issue have concluded that neither
proof of actual reliance nor of legal materiality is essential to render
the patent unenforceable. For example, in Diamond International
Corp. v. Walterhoef er," the court stated:
Defendants' approach, probably correct, is that if in the
prosecution of the patent application, plaintiff, intentionally
made deliberate misstatements of fact, intended to influence
ea 312 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
es Id. at 463.
64 324 U.S. at 816. See also A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d
11, 17-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968).
65 253 F. Supp. at 470.
60 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968).
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the conduct of the Patent Office, this would bar enforcement
whether or not the Patent Office was influenced by the alleged
misrepresentations, and whether or not the patent in suit
issued as a result thereof."
Similarly, the court in Abington Textile Machine Works v. Carding
Specialists, Canada Ltd.," stated that a patent may be declared in-
valid on the sole ground that the patentee made a deliberate, inten-
tional misrepresentation to the Patent Office even though the patent
might otherwise be valid in every respect." In further agreement is
Ritter v. Rohm & Haas Co.," where the court stated:
The maxim that he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands demands that those who deal with the Patent
Office must have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit in
obtaining a patent. A court will, therefore, refuse to enforce
a patent if it finds that the patentee made intentional mis-
representations to the Patent Examiner."
Thus, there is ample authority in support of the proposition that
neither actual reliance nor legal materiality is necessary to render a
patent unenforceable where deliberate misrepresentations have been
made to the Patent Office. In view of the strong policy underlying
the applicant's "uncompromising duty of disclosure," the doctrine
that tends to discourage a breach of that duty by rendering the patent
unenforceable is sound."
There is some authority, however, which tends to support a
contrary conclusion. In Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical
Co.," the Supreme Court considered the question of whether certain
misrepresentations concerning the use and sale of products made by
the patented process affected the statutory presumption of validity."
The Court found that a commercial sale or use was not necessary to
constitute a reduction to practice, but that a laboratory or test experi-
ment demonstrated discovery constituting a reduction to practice. It
was undisputed that there was not the commercial use referred to in
07 Id. at 570.
08 249 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1965).
60 Id. at 839.
70 Ritter v. Rohm & Haas Co., 271 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also A.H.
Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 17-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 835 (1968).
71 271 F. Supp. at 342.
72 See SCM v. Radio Corporation of America, 318 F. Supp. 433, 449 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Monsanto v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 793-94 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Corning Class Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966).
Contra, Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 312 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
78 276 U.S. 358 (1928).
74 Id. at 374.
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certain affidavits which were successful in overcoming the examiner's
third rejection. The Court declared:
Production of rubber-goods for use or sale was not in-
dispensable to the granting of the patent. Hence the affidavits,
though perhaps reckless, were not the basis for it or essen-
tially material to its issue. The reasonable presumption of
validity furnished by the grant of the patent therefore would
not seem to be destroyed."
Relying upon the decision in Corona Cord, the court in Baldwin-Lima-
Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Systems Co.7° concluded that a
false and reckless statement will not destroy the presumption of patent
validity unless the statement was "essentially material" to the issu-
ance of the patent."
If these decisions refer to situations where there has been an
intentional misrepresentation, their continuing vitality is doubtful.
Since a finding of legal materiality would be tantamount to a finding of
invalidity, the only reasonable construction to be given to the words
"essential materiality" is that they refer to "actual reliance." Indeed,
the court in Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton apparently focused upon the
question of actual reliance and concluded that since there was a re-
jection subsequent to the alleged misrepresentation, a finding of ma-
teriality "must rest at best upon a dubious and tenuous inference." 78
In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.," the Supreme
Court declared that having made an intentional misrepresentation the
patentees "are in no position now to dispute its effectiveness."' This
statement can be read as creating a presumption of actual reliance
and/or legal materiality.8' If this presumption of materiality were
viewed as irrebuttable, there is difficulty in reconciling the decision in
Hazel-Atlas with the statement in Corona Cord which upheld the
presumption of validity notwithstanding the fact that the Court con-
sidered the false affidavits to be reckless. .
- The apparent requirement in Corona Cord that the misleading
statements provide the basis for the issuance of the patent or be
"essentially material" to its issuance might be reconciled with current
78 Id.
78 169 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 894 (1959).
77
 169 F. Supp. at 24-25. Accord, Ransburg Electro Coating Corp. v. Nordson
Corp., 293 F. Supp. 448, 484 (N.D. 171. 1968).
78 169 P. Supp. at 25.
79 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
60 Id. at 247.
81 The court in SCM v. Radio Corporation of America, 318 F. Supp. 433, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), recognized that Hazei-Aaas lent itself to such an interpretation, but
rejected the quoted statement "as establishing a rule for all cases."
1018
MISREPRESENTATIONS BEFORE THE'PATENT OFFICE
doctrine on the ground that although the Court considered the mis-
statements "reckless," it did not use this term in the sense of the
reckless disregard for the truth of the statements, that is, tantamount
to an intentional misrepresentation," but was considering the effect of
a negligent or inadvertent misrepresentation. Alternatively, the pre-
sumption of materiality, that is, actual reliance, might be viewed as
rebuttable, and the decision in Corona Cord viewed as an instance
where the burden of proving non-reliance was met. But in Baldwin-
Lima-Hamilton, the court squarely placed the burden of proving re-
liance upon the party asserting fraud.'
Of course, if a court were to find actual reliance by the patent
examiner, it is quite clear that the reason underlying the statutory
presumption of validity, that is, deference to the expertise of the
Patent Office, has vanished, and there should be little question that
the presumption is destroyed. However, it is questionable whether
such actual reliance should be requisite to vitiate the presumption of
validity because even in certain situations where there was no evi-
dence of wrongful conduct, the failure of the Patent Office to be
apprised of certain pertinent art has been held to weaken greatly the
presumption of the validity." Finally, the wisdom of requiring proof
of actual reliance must be examined in light of the practicalities of
achieving such proof.
Since the patent examiner need not, and generally does not, give
his reasons for granting a patent, and since the policy of the Patent
Office is against permitting its examiners to testify in private litiga-
tion,' a court is faced with the burden of examining the file wrapper
to determine what the examiner would have done if the applicant had
been truthful. The most that this examination will reveal in the
ordinary course of events is that there has been a rejection that has
been overcome. If the rejection was based upon one specific ground,
and the misrepresentation specifically traversed this objection, this
82 W. Prosser, Law of Torts 715-33 (1964 ed.).
83
 169 F. Supp. at 25.
84 See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 560-61.
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970).
85 The Chief Solicitor of the Patent Office has recently stated that "[a]s pointed
out in § 1701 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, the Office has followed
the policy which is almost 100 years old, of forbidding its employees to testify in patent
suits, upon penalty of discharge, except upon court order, and more recently has in-
structed examiners to refrain from expressing any opinion to persons outside of the
Office (including employees of other Government agencies) whether an Issued patent is
valid, or whether they would have issued a certain patent if they had knowledge of
certain prior art at the time of examinations." Cochran, Historical Review of Fraud in
Patent Procurement: The Standaids and Procedures for Doing Business Before the
Patent Office, 52 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 69, 75-76 (1970). He also stated that the Patent
Office will continue to move to quash subpoenas directed to patent examiners. Id. at 79.
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might serve as an adequate predicate for a finding of actual reliance:
Such a result, however, is far from certain if the court must base its
finding upon something other than the normal standard of the pre-
ponderance of evidence, but rather, must base such a finding of fraud
on "clear and convincing proof."" If the application is issued with-
out a rejection, or if the patent has been amended in some other re-
spect, this burden becomes even more onerous. Moreover, if there
is a rejection subsequent to the misrepresentation followed by even-
tual issuance, meeting the burden of proving actual reliance is almost
impossible."
The difficulties in proving actual reliance are attested to by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Hazel-Atlas:
Doubtless it is wholly impossible accurately to appraise
the influence that the article exerted on the judges. But we
do not think the circumstances call for such an attempted
appraisal. Hartford's officials and lawyers thought the article
material. They conceived it in an effort to persuade a hostile
Patent Office to grant their patent application, and went to
considerable trouble and expense to get it published. Having
lost their infringement suit based on the patent in the District
Court wherein they did not specifically emphasize the article,
they urged the article upon the Circuit Court and prevailed.
They are in no position now to dispute its effectiveness. . . . 88
Where problems of proof present great burdens, there is ample prece-
dent for placing the burden upon the wrongdoer for the uncertainties
caused by his own wrongdoing. As the Supreme Court so cogently
phrased it: "The most elementary conceptions of justice and public
policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty
which his own wrong has created.""
In apparent recognition of the fact that no one can tell with
certainty what would have happened if the patent applicant had dealt
fairly with the Patent Office, the court in SCM refused to enforce the
patent." There is no reason why these same factors should not result
88 Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143, 149 (7th Cir. 1960).
81 This was the factual situation presented in Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Tatnall
Systems, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aird, 268 F2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 894 (1959).
88 322 U.S. at 247.
89 Bigelow v. RICO Radio Pictures Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946); SCM v. Radio
Corp. of America, 318 F. Supp. 433, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
90 This result of eliminating the requirement of proving actual reliance is con-
sistent with, if not compelled by, the logic of the doctrine that "overclaiming" as to
one of several claims of a patent results in the invalidity of the entire patent unless
the patentee shows that the overclaiming was due to inadvertence or mistake and that
• 1020
MISREPRESENTATIONS BEFORE THE PATENT OFFICE
in the patentee suffering the lesser disability of the destruction of the
presumption of validity. This is apparently the tack taken by the
Fifth Circuit in Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc."
There the court stated:
A presumption of validity ordinarily attaches to patents
that have survived the scrutiny of the Patent Office.. . .
But the presumption of validity rests on the fact that patent
approval is a species of "administrative determination sup-
ported by evidence." Consequently, when the defendants in
an infringement suit attack the validity of a patent on the
ground that it included prior art that has not been presented
to the patent office, the basis for the presumption vanishes, the
presumption is significantly weakened, and the Court is re-
quired to scrutinize the patent more closely. In this case,
appellants, for whatever reason, did not present the Stow de-
vice to the Patent Office and hence we must compare that
invention against the patent at suit without the usual strong
presumption in favor of validity."
Finally, the court explained that the reason for its de novo inspection
of the patent against the Stow device was that the latter invention
was never brought to the attention of the Patent Office. The court
observed that there was no indication that this omission was caused
by oversight, "rather all the evidence tends to show that Beckman
made the omission deliberately.""
A recognition of the difficulties of proof of reliance by the patent
examiner, especially since he is generally not available to testify, and
the societal interest in encouraging the utmost candor and truthfulness
in Patent Office proceedings justifies the conclusion that intentional
misrepresentations should not only bar enforcement of the patent but
also destroy the presumption of validity, regardless of legal materiality
or actual reliance.
IV. MISREPRESENTATIONS BEFORE THE PATENT OFFICE AS
A PREDICATE FOR AN ANTITRUST ACTION
As discussed earlier, the court in SCM found no antitrust liability
arising from a misrepresentation before the Patent Office because
there was insufficient proof of actual reliance. If such reliance were
requisite to a finding that the presumption of validity is destroyed,
a prompt disclaimer was filed. Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 57-58
(1943).
91 428 E.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
02 Id. at 560-61.
93 Id. at 564.
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logic dictates that it be requisite to a finding of fraud sufficient. to .
support an antitrust claim. On the other hand, if the conclusion of
the preceding analysis is correct in that neither legal materiality nor
actual reliance is requisite to a destruction of the presumption of
validity, no such result is required. On the contrary, the same argu-
ments regarding the difficulties of proving actual reliance, and the
public policy requiring that a wrongdoer bear the risk of uncertainty
which his own wrong has created, urge that proof of actual reliance
not be considered requisite to an antitrust action predicated upon
misrepresentations before the Patent Office. Moreover, if the misrepre-
sentations are legally material, it is not entirely unrealistic to assume
that if the examiner knew the true facts he would have applied the
proper legal standard and refused to have issued the patent.
Although a requirement of less than actual reliance is a deviation
from the normal tort standard of proof, the unavailable patent ex-
aminer must be contrasted with the plaintiff in the ordinary tort
action who will readily testify on his own behalf that he would have
acted differently had he been aware of the facts. Normally, in the
case where there has been non-disclosure of a material fact, there will
be no recorded proof of what the examiner would have done if he had
known the facts not disclosed. Even in the case of an affirmative mis-
representation the wrongdoer can point to the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Hazel-Atlas regarding the ghost-written article: "Doubtless it
is wholly impossible accurately to appraise the influence that the
article asserted on the judges."" Requiring that the antitrust claimant
prove actual reliance will, in most instances, create a rule of ev-
idence that has the effect of being a rule of law barring recovery. A
conscious wrongdoer with knowledge that his invention is not patent-
able runs virtually no practical risk by misleading the Patent Office
since, if he does not, in all probability no patent will issue, and unless
the examiner should somehow indicate his reliance, the only real
disability he faces is that his invalid patent is unenforceable. In short,
at least where the misrepresentation is legally material, there should
be no requirement to prove actual reliance as a requisite to an antitrust
action.
Also at issue in this area is the question of whether proof of legal
materiality should be required for an antitrust action predicated upon
a fraudulently procured patent. In Corning Glass, the court made it
quite clear that it considered the legal materiality necessary for a
finding of fraud insufficient for the finding of an antitrust violation:
A recent Supreme Court case, Walker Process Equip-
94 322 U.S. at 247.
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ment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., which
conclusively settled the issue that obtaining a patent by
means of fraud upon the Patent Office can be the basis for an
anti-trust suit, necessarily assumed that the intentional mis-
representations were a material factor in obtaining the patent.
If one were entitled to a patent under the legal tests of
patentability, there is no illegal monopoly resulting from the
statements on which to base an anti-trust action. Conse-
quently, the counterclaim based on fraud obtaining the pat-
ent in contravention of § 2 of the Sherman Act fails. The
common law fraud counterclaim fails for the same reason."
In the common law action of fraud, the party asserting fraud
must prove not only actual reliance, but also that he was justified in
acting upon the misrepresentation. This requirement, often called ma-
teriality, refers to the objective standard of whether a reasonable
man would have been misled by the misrepresentation." This is
analogous to the concept of legal materiality in cases involving mis-
representations before the Patent Office. The reason for this require-
ment in the common law fraud action was to provide "some assurance
that the representee is not merely using the misrepresentation as a
pretext for escaping a bargain that he is dissatisfied with on other
grounds."" In other words, it supports the conclusion that the repre-
sentation has caused or induced the action which resulted in damage
to the party asserting fraud.
In the common law action for fraud, the question of causation
should be adequately disposed of by the representee's testimony that
he actually relied upon the misrepresentation; indeed, "where the
misrepresentation is intended to deceive, it will be regarded as ma-
terial if the maker knows that the recipient is peculiarly disposed to
regard it as important even though the standard reasonable man
would not do so.""
As has been shown, however, in the usual patent fraud situation,
there will be no proof of actual reliance. Moreover, with regard to a
misrepresentation that is not legally material, there is force to the
argument that there is not a sufficient predicate for an antitrust viola-
tion on the ground that the antitrust claimant cannot prove he has
been damaged by the conduct of the applicant since it may be presumed
95 253 F. Supp. at 470. But see Diamond International Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289
F. Supp. 550, 573 n.114 (D. Md. 1968).
90 Prosser, supra note 82, at 734-46.
97 Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation:
L. Rev. 56, 59 (1949).
" Prosser, supra note 82, at 735.
Legal Fault as a Requirement, 2 OW.
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that even- if there were no misrepresentation, a patent would have
issued. In other words, if the true facts were known, the Patent Office
would have applied the correct legal standard and granted the patent,
and, therefore, the misrepresentation had no effect. This argument
has even more force if the court considers the question of legal ma-
teriality without the benefit of any statutory presumption of validity,
and the patentee has borne the burden of proving that a patent should
have issued notwithstanding the facts belied by the misrepresentations.
If an intentional misrepresentation bars the enforcement of the
patent regardless of legal materiality, there would be little detriment
to the policy of encouraging full disclosure before the Patent Office
by not allowing the antitrust claim. The conscious wrongdoer will be
aware that he is liable under the antitrust laws if he fraudulently se-
cures a patent through intentional and material misrepresentations.
In conclusion, if the issue before the court is the enforceability
of a patent, a deliberate misrepresentation should be sufficient to bar
enforcement of the patent, regardless of legal materiality or actual
reliance. If the question is whether there is an adequate predicate for
a damage action, proof of legal materiality may be considered requisite,
but this issue should be decided without any presumption of ma-
teriality favoring the patentee. And finally, there should be no require-
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